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MISSING IN ACTION:
PRISONERS OF WAR AT GUANTANAMO BAY
Jerica M. Morris-Frazier*
INTRODUCTION

The United States of America has presented a national and international image of fairness, justice, and humane treatment of others, while abiding by the laws
to which it is bound. However, the reputation of the United States has been
tarnished by its seemingly prolonged internment of detainees at Guantanamo
Bay. After reports of torture, sexual degradation, and the refusal to apply prisoner of war status to any of the detainees the world is looking to the United
States for answers and demanding changes to the current situation at Guantanamo Bay. This paper focuses on the lack of application of prisoner of war status, as provided for in the Geneva Convention, to Guantanamo Bay detainees.
This paper also examines the United States Supreme Court decisions reviewing
the extension of United States jurisdiction to the Guantanamo Bay detainees and
other international treaties the United States is a party to that provide for the
detainees' rights to a fair trial.
DELIMITFATION OF THE PROBLEM

The Specific Problem
The Geneva Convention places heavy emphasis on international standards for
detention of enemy combatants, spies, and prisoners of war ("POWs") 1 in time of
military conflict. Currently, the United States is receiving international and national public scrutiny for its detainment of alleged terrorists or terrorist cohorts at
the Guantanamo Bay military facility in Cuba.
The United States acquired a perpetual lease of territorial control over Guantanamo Bay from the 1903 Cuban-American Treaty.2 This treaty provides that
the United States has "complete jurisdiction and control" over Guantanamo Bay,
*

J.D. candidate 2010, University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law.
Jerica Morris-Frazier, Notes Editor of the University of the District of Columbia David Clarke School
of Law, Law Review, would like to thank the men and women of the United States Armed Forces
that risk their lives everyday to defend the freedoms and values of the United States of America.
1 The official United States military term for an enemy prisoner of war is "enemy prisoner of
war" ("EPW"), but they will be referred to as "POWs" herein. Eric Schmitt, War In The Gulf:
P.O.W.'s; U.S. Says Prisoners Seem War-Weary, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1991, at A7, available at 1991
WLNR 3021129.
2 Yale Law School The Avalon Project, Agreement Between the United States and Cuba for
the Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval stations; Feb. 23, 1903, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20thcentury/dip-cubaOO2.asp (last visited April 23, 2009) [hereinafter Cuban-American Treaty].
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while Cuba retains ultimate sovereignty. 3 In 1934, the treaty was renegotiated,
allowing free access through the bay and modifying the lease payment from
$2,000 in U.S. gold coins to $3,085 in U.S. dollars per year.4 Furthermore, under
the 1934 treaty, the lease of Guantanamo Bay is permanent unless both Cuba and
the United States agree to its termination or the United States abandons the

property altogether.5
Since October of 2001, the beginning of the "War on Terror," 779 detainees
have been brought to Guantanamo Bay.6 Approximately 500 of these detainees
have been released without charges, 7 but as of January 2009, about 245 detainees
remain at the base.8 Of the 245 remaining, several of the detainees are cleared
9
for release, but have not left because "countries are reluctant to accept them."
The United States signed the 1949 Geneva Convention on August 12, 1949,10

and ratified it August 2, 1955.11 Afghanistan signed and ratified the Convention
on December 8, 1949, and September 26, 1956, respectively. 12 Iraq accessioned
the Convention on February 14, 1956.13 Article 2 states that the Geneva Conven-

tion "shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which
may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state

of war is not recognized by one of them."' 14 Therefore, countries that are part of
a conflict that are also parties to the conventions are bound by its terms. The
United States, Iraq, and Afghanistan are High Contracting Parties involved in
undeclared armed conflict; therefore pursuant to Article 2, each country must
3 Id. at art. 3.
4 Id.
5 Yale Law School The Avalon Project, Treaty Between the United States of America and
Cuba; May 29, 1934, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th-century/dip-cubaO01.asp (last visited April 23,
2009).
6 Kim Barker, From Locked Up to Boxed in Afghanistan Lacks Reintegration Planfor ex-Guantanamo Detainees, Leaving Them Fighting to Fit in and Feeling the Battlefield's Pull, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
4, 2009, at 4, available at 2009 WLNR 4142365.
7 The Associated Press, 3 PrisonersLet Out of Guantanamo,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2008, at A22,
available at 2008 WLNR 16626194.
8 Mark Mazzetti and Scott Shane, Where Will Guantanamo Detainees Go?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
2009, at A13, available at 2009 WLNR 1406715.
9 Id.
10 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, available at http://www.un.org/preventgenocide/rwandaltext-images/GenevaPOW.pdf [hereinafter Convention on POWs].
11 Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, State Parties, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?
ReadForm&id=375&ps=P (last visited April 28, 2009) (applying a reservation/declaration to the Convention allowing the exclusion or modification of the legal effect of the application of certain provisions of the treaty to the U.S., provided that the reservation does not interfere with the object and
purpose of the treaty.).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Convention on POWs, supra note 10, at art. 2.
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provide humane treatment to prisoners of war. According to the Geneva Convention, prisoners of war are "persons belonging to one of the following catego15
ries, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party
to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if
this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps,
including such organized resistance movements, fulfil [sic.] the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war
correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour [sic.] units or of
services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that
they have received authorization, from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card
similar to the annexed model.
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the
merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the
conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable [sic.] treatment under
any other provisions of international law.
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the
enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without
having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided
6
they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.'
Based on this definition, not only are the official military troops of the United
States, Iraq, and Afghanistan protected as prisoners of war, but also the members
of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and any other informal militia units. The Prisoner of
War status is even extended to civilians who are captured with the "enemy" mili15

16

Id.at art. 4(A).
Id.
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tia members, but are not members of the group themselves. 17 Even those people
inhabiting the invaded territory that took up arms to fight against the invasion
should be afforded prisoner of war status.1 8 Therefore, under this definition, a
majority, if not all, of the detainees held at Guantanamo Bay captured during the
"War on Terror" qualify for Prisoner of War status allowing for humane treatment and the application of POW privileges. Humane treatment of prisoners of
war, as detailed in Article 13, involves,
Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention. In
particular, no prisoner of war may be subjected to physical mutilation or to
medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are not justified by the
medical, dental or hospital treatment of the prisoner concerned and carried
out in his interest.
Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly
against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public
curiosity.
Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.1 9
Throughout the "War on Terror" conflict, the United States has been accused
of ill treatment of detainees interned at Guantanamo Bay. Released detainees
have accused the United States of flagrantly violating Article 13 of the Convention. Detainees have alleged they were subjected to the following: inadequate
food or healthcare; physical mutilation during torture with glass and cigarettes;
sleep deprivation; light and sound manipulation; and exposure and temperature
extremes. 20 The United States has also been accused of sexual assault, religious
persecution, and sexual degradation21 violating Article 13 and Article 14.22 Assuming arguendo these allegations are true, the United States completely disregarded these two provisions of the Geneva Convention in its treatment of
detainees at Guantanamo Bay.
There are additional accusations of forced feedings to detainees who are hunger-striking or wish to die. 23 Article 26 of the Convention concerns food for
POWs, which states in part, "The basic daily food rations shall be sufficient in
17
18
19
20

Id. at art. 4(A)(3).
Id. at art. 4(A)(6).
See Convention on POWs, supra note 10, at art. 13.
CTR. FOR CONST. Rrs., REP. ON TORTURE AND CRUEL,

INHUMAN, AND DEGRADING TREAT-

(2006), 18-28, http://ccrjustice.org/filestReportReportOnTorture.pdf. [hereinafter CTR.FOR CONST. RTs.J.
MENT OF PRISONERS AT GUANTANAMO

21

BAY, CUBA

Id.

22 Article 14 states in part, "Prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for
their persons and their honour [sic]." See Convention on POWs, supra note 10, at art. 14.
23 CTR. FOR CONST.RTS., supra note 20, at 29.

MISSING IN ACTION

quantity, quality and variety to keep prisoners of war in good health and to prevent loss of weight or the development of nutritional deficiencies.' 24 If these
force-feeding accusations are true, the United States, ironically, is in full compliance with Article 26. Perhaps forced feedings may be an extreme measure to
take, but in doing so the United States is making certain these detainees remain
alive and healthy.
CONFLICTING CLAIMS

Issues Surrounding the Problem

The main point of contention the international community has with the United
States and the detainees held at Guantanamo Bay is the application of POW
status to the detainees. The 1949 Geneva Convention expanded upon the protections previous conventions 2 5 afforded to prisoners of war. The drafters purposefully set out to clearly and explicitly define a prisoner of war to eliminate any
confusion or ambiguity by Contracting Parties. 26 This clear POW definition
should reasonably equip Contracting Parties to quickly assess detainees' status.
Despite the clear definition of POW status, the United States alleges there are no
detainees currently held at Guantanamo Bay warranting POW status as defined
under Article 4 of the Geneva Convention.2 7 The United States defends this
position because the members of the Taliban and al Qaeda allegedly were not
uniformed soldiers or guerrillas wearing "distinctive insignia," were not "being
commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates," bearing arms openly,
or abiding by the rules of war as required by Article 4.28 Yet upon a proper
application of Article 4, many of the detainees would meet at least two of the
four conditions listed. However, the commentaries to Article 4 state "[tihe qualification of belligerent 29 is subject to these four conditions being fulfilled." ' 30 But
many of the detainees may still fall under POW status if they are "inhabitants of a
non-occupied territory who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take
up arm to resist the invading forces,, 31 referring to a "mass rising. '' 32 The com24 See Convention on POWs, supra note 10, at art. 26.
25 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War Commentary, art. 4, Aug.
12, 1949 at art. 4, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/375-590007?OpenDocument [hereinafter Convention Commentary] (referring to the Hague Convention of 1899 and the First Geneva Convention of
1929).
26 Id. ("Contrary to the solution adopted in 1929, the drafters of the 1949 Convention considered, from the outset, that the Convention should specify the categories of protected persons and not
merely refer to the Hague Regulations (7). Article 4 is in a sense the key to the Convention, since it
defines the people entitled to be treated as prisoners of war.").
27 Cmr. FOR COasT. RTs., supra note 20, at 13-14.
28 Id.
29 Term belligerent is synonymous to detainee. See Convention Commentary, supra note 25.
30 Convention Commentary, supra note 25.
31 Id.
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mentaries further state that when inhabitants carry arms openly and respect the
laws and customs of war they should be recognized as a POW "even though they
may not have had time to form themselves into regular armed units as required
by Article 1.,'3 3 The difficulty in applying this expanded explanation of Article 4
is deciphering which detainees were mere inhabitants and which were actually
members of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or any enemy militia.
Along with the POW status comes specific guidelines of treatment, questioning, 34 healthcare, 35 and internment that should be followed by the Detaining
Power. The Convention explicitly states in Article 17 that torture may not be
used to question a detainee who has met the requirements of a POW. Article 17
states in part:
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind
whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened,
insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any
kind.36

While these privileges accompany POW status, it is the Detaining Power that
must ultimately determine a detainee's POW status. The United States maintains
POWs are not located at Guantanamo Bay and therefore interrogations are not
bound to the terms set forth in Article 17. The failure to apply POW status has
left the United States open to attack from released detainees claiming to have
been tortured while at Guantanamo Bay.
Another issue stemming from the United States' internment of the detainees
without POW status is the limited civilian access provided to them. Members of
the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") are permitted into the
detention areas to provide medical attention and verify the detainees have adequate food, water, and healthcare. 3 7 The ICRC is the only independent body
allowed into the camp without invitation and/or a full escort throughout the dura32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Article 17 states in part:
"every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname,
first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information. If he wilfully [sic.] infringes this rule, he may render himself
liable to a restriction of the privileges accorded to his rank or status."
Convention on POWs, supra note 10, art. 17.
35 See id. at art. 25-28 (Quarters, Food and Clothing of Prisoners of War) and at art. 29-32
(Hygiene and Medical Attention).
36 See id. at art. 17.
37 Interview by Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross with Dominik Stillhart, Deputy Director of Operations, Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross (Jun. 3, 2008), http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/
confidentiality-interview-010608?opendocument (last visited Apr. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Interview
with Stillhart].
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tion of the camp visit.3 8 The ICRC is allowed in Guantanamo Bay because the

organization conducts its work with the utmost confidentiality. 39 Any human
rights violations found by the ICRC are reported only to the proper channels of
the U.S. military and government personnel.40 Since 2002, the ICRC has "facilitated the exchange" of letters to and from detainees and their families. 4' Also,
ICRC has arranged for detainees to have a one-hour phone call once a year to

family members.42 Under the Geneva Convention Article 71, a "[p]risoner of
war shall be allowed to send and receive letters and cards.",43 The Detaining

Power may limit the frequency of correspondence allowed to each detainee to the
Article 71 minimum of "two letters and four cards" per month as it deems neces-

sary. 4 Furthermore, the correspondence "must be conveyed by the most rapid
method at the disposal of the Detaining Power; they may not be delayed or retained for disciplinary reason." 4 5 Had the United States deemed any of the
Guantanamo detainees POWs, the ICRC would not have had to initiate the opportunity for the detainees to communicate with their families.
The failure to provide POW status to detainees besmirches the United States'

international reputation regarding Guantanamo Bay.46 Furthermore, with the
ICRC effectively gagged from disclosing any information about possible Geneva
Convention violations and the United States' tight-hold on who enters the facility, the world only has the accusations of released detainees to provide insight
38 Cuba -Guantanamo Bay (ABC television broadcast May 28, 2003) (Interview by Jill Colgan,
Foreign Correspondent, in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba) (transcript on file with the author), available at
http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/stories/s866115.htm. The foreign correspondent was escorted the entire
time she was in Guantanamo Bay, even when questioning the officers. "We can talk to young camp
guards, but never alone." Id.
39 Interview with Stillhart, supra note 37 ("Our main focus is on improving conditions for people affected by conflict and hostilities, regardless of who they are. We do speak out on some issues
and we also offer assessments of the humanitarian situation in conflict-affected countries around the
world, but when it comes to addressing possible violations of international humanitarian law, it's very
important that we are able to do this primarily in a confidential manner.").
40 Id. ("If the ICRC marks a report as confidential, it means that it is intended only for the
authorities or parties to the conflict to whom it is addressed. We object to any sharing or publication
of this information without our consent."). See also Cuba - Guantanamo Bay, supra note 38 ("To
guarantee ongoing access to prisoners around the world, the Red Cross agrees to report what it finds
only to the authorities holding the prisoners.").
41 Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Guantanamo internee speaks by telephone with family in
Sudan, Jun. 19, 2008, http:l/www.icrc.orglweb/englsiteengO.nsflhtmlalllsudan-news-190608?open
document.
42 Id. (The phone calls were arranged April 3, 2008. An exception to one call a year is in cases
of "special circumstances, such as when a death has occurred in their immediate family.").
43 Convention on POWs, supra note 10, art. 71.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See Kate Zernike, Administration Prods Congress To Curb the Rights of Detainees, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 13, 2006, at Al, availableat 2006 WLNR 12041290. See also National Security Network, A
National Security Legacy of Failure (2009), http:llwww.nsnetwork.orglnodell177.

UNIVERSITY OF THE DisTRicr OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

into Guantanamo Bay activities. It is no surprise that the United States is receiving public backlash for some activities carried out at Guantanamo Bay. There
are unfettered allegations of offering cash bounties to Afghan tribesmen in return
for the capture of believed members of al Qaeda and the Taliban;4 7 excessive
torture of detainees; abuse of detainees' religions;4 8 and admissions of having
juvenile enemy combatants as detainees.4 9

Supreme Court precedent demonstrates the United States utilized Guantanamo Bay as a detention facility for enemy combatants during several military
conflicts, while receiving little to no public backlash or outcries for the closure of
the base. So why now, why this "war?" Perhaps it is due to the "media age,"
which is constantly expanding the information accessible to the public. Or, perhaps it is because the patriotism and national security mentalities that were the
majority during other military endeavors are not the same as society's today. Regardless of the reasoning, one thing is certain: "torture" of enemy combatants,
detainees, or POWs for information relating to national security has been present
50
throughout the history of war and conducted by those countries party to a war.
Granted there can be excessive amounts or types of torture, but torture nonetheless has been a staple in war and a method to gather information.
The Roman maxim says it all, Inter arma silent leges, meaning "During war, the

law is silent."' 51 This maxim is prevalent in Justice Scalia's dissents in Rasul v.
Bush5 2 and Boumediene v. Bush.53 In both dissents, Justice Scalia maintained

that the extension of U.S. jurisdiction to Guantanamo Bay "is an irresponsible
overturning of settled law in a matter of extreme importance to our force cur47 Carol Rose, Op-Ed., Justice Delayed, Denied for Gitmo's Detainees, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 1,
2008, at 17, available at 2008 WLNR 642515. See also Mark Denbeaux et al., REP. ON GUANTANAMO
DETAINEES: A PROFILE OF 517 DETAINEES APP. A (2006), http://law.shu.edu/news/guantanamore-

port final_2_08_06.pdf (examples of bounty flyers supposedly from the United States).
48 Released detainees have "alleged that abuse of religion including flushing the Qur'an down
the toilet, defacing the Qur'an, writing comments and remarks on the Qur'an, tearing pages out of the
Qur'an and denying detainees a copy of the Qur'an." CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., supra note 20.
49 See Cuba - Guantanamo Bay, supra note 38 (television interview by Jill Colgan, Foreign
Correspondent with Major General G. Miller of the U.S. Army).
(TO MILLER) Are there any juveniles in Guantanamo?
MAJOR GENERAL GEOFFREY MILLER: There are enemy juvenile combatants
here. For our definition, that is any one who is less than sixteen years old.
COLGAN: So there are people under 16 years of age here who are enemy combatants?
MAJOR GENERAL GEOFFREY MILLER: That's correct.
50 See History.com, Encyclopedia: Torture, http://www.history.com/encyclopedia.do?articleld=
224327 (last visited Nov. 8, 2009).
51 See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (Norman A. Knoff ed., 1998) (President Lincoln captured the underpinning of this maxim in his
response to criticism of limitations placed upon civil liberties during the Civil War.).
52 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
53 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. _,
128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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rently in the field,"' 4 thereby reaffirming restriction of U.S. jurisdiction in areas
outside U.S. sovereignty. Justice Scalia insisted that the majority erred in its
decision stating: "Today, the Court springs a trap on the Executive, subjecting
Guantanamo Bay to the oversight of the federal courts even though it has never
before been thought to be within their jurisdiction-and thus making it a foolish
place to have housed alien wartime detainees. "56
Given the history of the United States, Justice Scalia's argument was warranted and valid, especially in light of the continuing conflict in the Middle-East.
The Rasul decision leaves Guantanamo Bay wide open for non-U.S. detainees,
who have been associated with an anti-American group, to have access and benefits that are not given to U.S. detainees in other countries. Using the majority's
"jurisdiction and control" argument 57 to extend jurisdiction to areas in which
United States retains captured detainees, one may say, as Justice Scalia stated,
that parts of Afghanistan and Iraq will also fall within the jurisdiction of U.S.
laws. 58 Justice Scalia correctly summed up the appalling Rasul majority decision
by stating, "to create such a monstrous scheme in time of war, and in frustration
of our military commanders' reliance upon clearly stated prior law, is judicial
adventurism of the worst sort." 59 In Boumediene, the Court's extension of jurisdiction by intervening into a military matter, regulated by the Constitution, was
"entirely ultra vires.' '60 Relying on past precedent, Justice Scalia offers a "jurisdictional" test, which is essentially a more specific test extending jurisdiction only
to those detainees located within U.S. sovereignty or territory.61 If the real test is
"functional," as the Court held, then there will not be any consideration of territorial boundaries. Without such consideration, the majority's decision would create a possibility of extension of U.S. jurisdiction to any area that the United
States has some minimal "control" over. 62 Furthermore, an extra burden will be
placed upon military commanders by creating "the impossible task of proving to
a civilian court, under whatever standards this Court devises in the future, that
63
evidence supports the confinement of each and every enemy prisoner."
The "War on Terror" is a difficult military endeavor because the troops are
fighting a nameless, faceless, and anonymous enemy. It is unclear who is a part of
54 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 497-98.
55 Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2295, 2298-99.
56 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 497-98.
57 Id. at 480.
58 Id. at 501 (Scalia, J. dissenting) ("Since 'jurisdiction and control' obtained through lease is no
different in effect from 'jurisdiction and control' acquired by lawful force of arms, parts of Afghanistan and Iraq should logically be regarded as subject to our domestic laws.").
59 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 506.
60 Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2294.
61 Id. at 2300-02.
62 Id. at 2303-06.
63 Id. at 2307.
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an enemy militia and who is merely a citizen caught in the midst of battle. The
use of detention and interrogation of captured detainees is essential to weed out
those who are truly a threat to national security and the U.S. troops.64 If extensive periods of detention are necessary to protect national security, it is warranted. However, the United States is keeping the activities and treatment of the
detainees held at Guantanamo Bay secret, which enables skeptics and critics to
ignore the fact that such detention may be for national security purposes. It feeds
into the public hysteria and outcry for justice and the extension of U.S. legal
jurisdiction.
PAST TRENDS

In Johnson v. Eisentrager,65 the Supreme Court was tasked with determining
whether aliens should be granted access to U.S. federal court jurisdiction. In
Eisentrager,twenty-one German citizens were tried in China by a U.S. military
commission for conspiracy against the United States by aiding and abetting Japan
after Germany's surrender; a violation of the law of war.6 6 The Court held that
"the Constitution does not confer a right of personal security or an immunity
from military trial and punishment upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile
service of a government at war with the United States.",67 Furthermore, the
Court held that an enemy alien or non-citizen outside the United States' jurisdicand privileges as
tion, like Guantanamo Bay, will not be afforded the same rights
68
limits.
jurisdictional
the
within
detained
were
she
or
he
if
After September 11, 2001, all those captured in Afghanistan were held at
Guantanamo Bay because under Eisentrager,Guantanamo Bay was not deemed
under United States' territory for jurisdictional purposes. 69 However, the Supreme Court redefined Guantanamo Bay Naval Base's jurisdictional standing in
64 See Charles Stimson, Holding TerroristsAccountable: A Lawful Detainment Frameworkfor
the Long War, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Jan. 23, 2009, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/lm35.cfm#_ftn5 (stating, "Military detention of some detainees is appropriate,
consistent with long historical practice, and a necessary and lawful tool in the current conflict.... Yet
military detention, properly calibrated and designed to complement our broader national security and
counterterrorism policy, is necessary, not only for some detainees currently detained at Guantanamo
but also for future captures of high-value detainees.").
65 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
66 Id. at 766. See also Id. at 788 ("Capitulations agreed upon between contracting parties must
take into account the rules of military honour. 'Once settled, they must be scrupulously observed by
both parties.' 'If there is one rule of the law of war more clear and peremptory than another, it is that
compacts between enemies, such as truces and capitulations, shall be faithfully adhered to;and their
non-observance is denounced as being manifestly at variance with the true interest any duty, not only
of the immediate parties, but of all mankind." (citations omitted)).
67 Id. at 785.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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Rasul v. Bush.7 ° In Rasul, fourteen nationals from countries not at war with the
United States were detained at Guantanamo Bay for allegedly engaging in acts of
aggression against the United States, without receiving access to a tribunal, notice
of any charges against them, or a conviction of wrongdoing. 71 The Court held
that "[alliens held at the base, no less than American citizens, are entitled to
invoke the federal courts' authority" under statutory provisions because "there is
little reason to think that Congress intended the geographical coverage of the
statute to vary depending on the detainee's citizenship. ' 72 This decision by the
Supreme Court, extending the United States jurisdiction to the Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base, essentially undermined the holding of Eisentrager. The Supreme
Court relied heavily upon the lease agreement with Cuba, which granted the
73
United States "complete jurisdiction and control" over the naval base area.
The Court disregarded the argument that Cuba retained complete sovereignty
since U.S. troops held the detainees at the naval base which was, by the lease
agreement, under U.S. jurisdiction and control. 4
For the first time, the Court determined the detainment issue regarding a
United States citizen apprehended as a member of an opponent force in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld.75 Hamdi was a U.S. citizen by birth, but his family members were
citizens of Saudi Arabia. Sixty days prior to his capture he and his family moved
back to Saudi Arabia. The Northern Alliance, which found Hamdi with the
Taliban in an active combat zone in Afghanistan holding an assault rifle, 76 later
turned him over to the United States military. The U.S. government viewed
Hamdi as an enemy combatant, thus justifying "holding him in the United States
indefinitely - without formal charges or proceedings - unless and until it makes
the determination that access to counsel or further process is warranted. '77 The
Supreme Court held that there is no bar on holding a U.S. citizen as an enemy
combatant because "[c]itizens who associate themselves with the military arm of
the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country
bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of ...the law of
war." 78 The Court reasoned that detention of a combatant was "necessary and
appropriate force" to prevent the combatant from returning to the battlefield.79
However, the Court held that under the Geneva Convention, Hamdi was entitled
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
ment."
77
78
79

Rasul v. Bush, 524 U.S. 466 (2004).
Id. at 476.
Id. at 481 (referencing the habeas corpus provision 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
Id. at 480. See also Cuban-American Treaty, supra note 2.
Rasul, 524 U.S. at 480.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
The Northern Alliance is "a coalition of military groups opposed to the Taliban governId. at 510.
Id.
Id. at 519.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519.
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to a formal determination of his enemy combatant status. The Court determined
that the indefinite detention of a U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant "for the
purpose of interrogation is not authorized, 80 because a U.S. citizen has the right
81
to contest his enemy combatant status in front of a neutral decision maker.
A military commission convened to try an alleged enemy combatant was
found to structurally and procedurally violate the Geneva Convention in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.82 Pursuant to Congressional authorization to the President
in the Authorization For Use Of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution Of
2002,83 allowing force against those involved in the September 11, 2001, attacks,84
President Bush "issued a comprehensive military order intended to govern the
'Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism."' 85 The Order included any non-citizen whom the President determined
"'there is reason to believe' that he or she (1) 'is or was' a member of al Qaeda or
(2) has engaged or participated in terrorist activities aimed at or harmful to the
United States."'86 Under this Order, a person found to have met these criteria
"shall" be tried by a military commission, but only for the offenses triable by such
a commission and punished accordingly, which includes imprisonment or death.8 7
Militia forces captured Hamdan, a Yemeni national, during hostilities against the
Taliban in Afghanistan and released him to the U.S. military.88 The U.S. military
transported Hamdan to Guantanamo Bay where he was alleged to have committed four "overt acts:" 1) acting as Osama bin Laden's bodyguard and personal
driver; 2) arranging transportation and actually transporting weapons used by al
Qaeda members and bin Laden's bodyguards; 3) driving or accompanying bin
Laden to "al Qaeda- sponsored training camps, press conferences, or lectures;"
and 4) receiving "weapons training at al Qaeda-sponsored camps." 89 After a
Combatant Status Review Tribunal determined Hamdan to be an enemy combatant, a military commission proceeding followed. 90 The Supreme Court reasoned
that although the President was authorized by Congress' Joint Resolution, that
authorization did not expand the President's "authority to convene military com80 Id. at 521.
81 Id. at 537.
82 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (finding also that the Uniform Code of Military
Justice was violated.).
83 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, H.J. Res. 114, Pub.
L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002), available at http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/US/Legislation/hirc-hjresll4report-100702.pdf.
84 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 557.
85 Id. at 568.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 566.
89 Id. at 570.
90 Id.
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missions." 91 The Court held that the President is "bound to comply with the rule
of law that prevails in this jurisdiction," thereby granting Hamdan access to U.S.
district courts.9 2 In reliance upon a military commission provision referencing
the "laws of war," the Court selectively incorporated only aspects of the Geneva
Convention that it found convenient to undercut the President's Executive Power
authorizing such military commissions. 93 In doing so, the majority changed the
very nature of the 94Geneva Convention and made it self-executing rather than
non-self-executing.
In the wake of the Hamdan decision, President George W. Bush signed the
Military Commissions Act of 2006 ("MCA"), which authorized trial by military
commissions for violations of the law of war by any "alien unlawful enemy combatant." 95 Violations of the law of war, however, by "lawful enemy combatants"9 6 are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.97 The MCA
essentially applies two different standards for enemy combatants, based on national origin, by dividing enemy combatants into "unlawful" and "lawful," which
91 Id. at 594.
92 Id. at 635.
93 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 716-18.
94 "Legal instruments may be self-executing according to various standards. For example, treaties are self-executing under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution (art. VI, § 2) if textually
capable of judicial enforcement and intended to be enforced in that manner." BLACKS LAW DiCTIONARY 643 (3d pocket ed. 2006). See also Human Rights First, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld Background Information on the Legal Issues in the Case, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us-law/inthecourts/supreme_
courthamdanbg.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2009) ("Courts generally refer to international treaties as
"self-executing" if they create rights that can be enforced in court without the need for further legislation to implement those rights.").
95 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at 10
U.S.C.A. §§ 948a- 950w (2006)). An unlawful enemy combatant is defined as:
(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy
combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al-Qaida, or associated forces); or
(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant
Status Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the authority of the
President or the Secretary of Defense.
10 U.S.C.A. § 948a(1)(A) (2006).
96 A "lawful enemy combatant" is defined as one who is:
(A) a member of the regular forces of a State party engaged in hostilities against the
United States;
(B) a member of a militia, volunteer corps, or organized resistance movement belonging
to a State party engaged in such hostilities, which are under responsible command, wear a
fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the law
of war; or
(C) a member of a regular armed force who professes allegiance to a government engaged in such hostilities, but not recognized by the United States."
10 U.S.C.A. § 948a(2) (2006).
97 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-881 (2006).
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is a violation of the Geneva Convention and international law. The MCA states
that a trial by a military commission "shall not apply"' 98 the following provisions:

1) speedy trial; 99 2) self-incrimination;' 0 0 and 3) pre-trial investigation.' 0 ' The
MCA also does not allow an "alien unlawful enemy combatant" to "invoke the
Geneva Convention as a source of rights."' 0 2 This legislation ultimately stripped
the detainees of any opportunity of receiving a fair hearing by an impartial decision-maker.
Also in 2006, the ICRC worked closely with the United States' administration
to implement improvements at Guantanamo Bay. The ICRC requested that the
United States "define the status and rights of individual detainees/internees and
to ensure they fitted [sic] into a proper and adequate legal framework providing
the relevant procedural safeguards." 10 3 The ICRC urged the United States to
comply with the Geneva Convention and any other recognized international standards that are applicable "concerning the treatment of detainees/internees and
their conditions of detention/internment.', 10 4 Because of the ICRC, communications were restored and maintained between the Guantanamo Bay detainees and
their families. 10 5 The ICRC also presented a report to the United States of its
findings and recommendations for the detention facility, in which the United
States agreed to make improvements to the detainees' conditions. 10 6 However, a
disagreement remained as to what
constituted "an appropriate legal framework
10 7
for U.S. detention operations.'
98 10 U.S.C.A. § 948b(d)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
99 10 U.S.C.A. § 948b(d)(1)(A) (2006) (referencing 10 U.S.C.A. § 810 (1956) which states in
part, "When any person subject to this chapter is placed in arrest or confinement prior to trial, immediate steps shall be taken to inform him of the specific wrong of which he is accused and to try him or
to dismiss the charges and release him.").
100 10 U.S.C.A. §948b(d)(1)(B) (2006) (referencing 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 831(a), (b), (d) (1982),
which states (a) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to incriminate himself or to
answer any question the answer to which may tend to incriminate him." (b) No person subject to this
chapter may interrogate, or request any statement from, an accused or a person suspected of an
offense without first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not
have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or suspected and that any
statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial. (d) No
statement obtained from any person in violation of this article, or through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement may be received in evidence against him in a trial by courtmartial.).
101 10 U.S.C.A. § 948b(d)(1)(C) (2006) (referencing 10 U.S.C.A. § 832 (1996)).
102 10 U.S.C.A. § 948b(g) (2006).
103 INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS ANNUAL REPORT 2006: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS, 301 (2006), http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/738d8t/$file/icrc-ar-06-eur-america.
pdfopenelement.
104 Id.
105 Id.at 302.
106 Id.
107 Id.at 301.
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The Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush granted by far the most expansive
extension of rights afforded to Guantanamo Bay detainees. 10 8 In Boumediene,
non-U.S. citizens captured in Afghanistan detained at Guantanamo Bay were denied access to federal court jurisdiction under the MCA because it effectively
denied federal court jurisdiction to actions pending at the time of its enactment. 10 9 The Court reasoned that three factors should be considered to determine whether jurisdiction should be extended to Guantanamo Bay: 1) "the
detainees' citizenship and status and the adequacy of the process through which
that status was determined;" 2) "the nature of the sites where apprehension and
then detention took place;" and 3) "the practical obstacles inherent in resolving
the prisoner's entitlement to the writ."' 110 In applying these factors to the petitioner detainees, the Court held that the detainees were entitled to privilege of
access to federal court jurisdiction because 1) the adequacy of the process used to
determine their status was lacking; 2) they were transferred from regions abroad
to Guantanamo Bay which is under United States' control; and 3) there were
minimal obstacles due to the proximity of Guantanamo to federal court jurisdictions.1" The Court further held that "the United States, by virtue of its complete
jurisdiction and control over the base, maintains de facto sovereignty over this
'1 12
territory."
While the United States Supreme Court has been grappling with the jurisdictional issues surrounding the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, the international
community has been defining basic rights and freedoms afforded to detainees,
especially those concerning the right to a fair trial. The most prominent treaty
encompassing these due process rights is the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR"), 113 which has similar provisions to those provided for
in the Geneva Convention, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, 1 14 and the American Convention on Human Rights. 115 The ICCPR states
108 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008).
109 Id. at 2242.
110 Id. at 2259.
111 Id. at 2259-60.
112 Id. at 2253.
113 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16,
1966), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edulrossrights/docs/pdfslUN-ICCPRhc.pdf [hereinafter
ICCPR]. The United States ratified the ICCPR on Jun. 8, 1992, with it taking effect Sep. 8, 1992, with
a declaration that articles 1-27 are not self-executing. UNrrED NATIONS-TREATY SERIES, INTERNATIONAL

COVENANT

ON CIVIL AND

POLITICAL

RIGHTS,

RATIFICATION

BY UNITED

STATES

OF

AMERICA (1992), http://untreaty.un.org/humanrightsconvs/ChaptIV_4/reservationsfUSA.pdf.

114 AMERICAN DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MAN, ADOPTED BY THE NINTH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES, BOGOTA. COLOMBIA (1948). http://www.oas.
org/DILUAmericanDeclaration-of theRights andDuties_ofMan.pdf [hereinafter American Declaration]. Although this is a declaration and not legally binding as a treaty, the Inter-American Court
and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have held that "the American Declaration is
today a source of international obligations for the OAS [Organization of American States] member
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that "everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law." 116 Like the Geneva Convention for POWs, the ICCPR holds that the right to a fair trial should be an
essential right provided for all. The prolonged detention of Guantanamo Bay
detainees without receiving charges placed against them is in violation of Article
9(1) of the ICCPR, which states "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or
detention. '1 17 Furthermore, Article 9(2) provides that "[a]nyone who is arrested
shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be
promptly informed of any charges against him." 118 A detainee has the right to be
informed of the charges against him in a language that he understands as provided for in Article 14(3)(f). 119
For detainees charged with a criminal offense, Article 9(3) of the ICCPR states
that a person "shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release.' 120 Moreover, Article 14(2) holds that "[e]veryone
charged with a criminal offense shall have the right to be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law."' 121 However, this does not prove true for the
detainees at Guantanamo Bay who have not been charged let alone been afforded an opportunity for a trial. Detainees are also afforded the right "[t]o have
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing" under the ICCPR.122 Therefore, a detainee's counsel should be granted access to any information, files, and
documents necessary for the preparation of the defense and the right to confer
with the detainee in private. Article 15(1) is a key provision within the ICCPR
relating to the detainees at Guantanamo Bay who were neither captured in an
active war zone nor bearing arms. The Article provides "[n]o one shall be held
guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not
states."

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, BASIC

DOCUMENTS PERTAINING To HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN

SYSTEM

7 (2003), http://

www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/libros/Basingl01.pdf.
115

Department of International Law, American Convention on Human Rights "Pact of San

Jose, Costa Rica," Nov. 22, 1969, http://oas.orgljuridicolenglishltreatieslb-32.html (signed by the
United States June 1, 1977.) [hereinafter ACHR].
116 ICCPR, supra note 113, art. 14. See also American Declaration, supra note 114, at art. 18
(Right to a Fair Trial).
117 ICCPR, supra note 113, art. 9(1). See also ACHR, supra note 115 art. 7(3); American Declaration, supra note 114, art. 2 (Right to equality before law).
118 ICCPR, supra note 113, art. 9(2). See also ACHR, supra note 115, art. 7(4).
119 ICCPR, supra note 113, art. 14(3)(f. See also ACHR, supra note 115, art. 8(2)(a) (A detainee is entitled "[t]o have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the
language used in court.").
120 ICCPR, supra note 113, art. 9(3). See also ACHR, supra note 115, art. 7(5).
121 ICCPR, supra note 113, art. 14(2). See also ACHR, supra note 115, art. 8(2).
122 ICCPR, supra note 113, art. 14(3)(b). See also ACHR, supra note 115, art. 8(2)(c).
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under national and international law, at the time
constitute a criminal offence,
123
committed.
when it was
FUTURE TRENDS
12 4
dissent, "The
Justice Scalia powerfully concluded in his Boumediene v. Bush
125
Scalia
Justice
As
Nation will live to regret what the Court has done today.,
26
feared and predicted in Boumediene,1 the potential expansion of U.S. jurisdic-

tion to detention facilities abroad has come to the forefront in the recent United
States District Court for the District of Columbia decision Al Maqaleh v.
Gates.1 27 In Al Maqaleh, four detainees, one a citizen of Afghanistan, were captured outside Afghanistan's borders. 2 8 These men were detained as enemy com29
batants "for six or more years" at the United States Air Force base at Bagram
130
Judge Bates held
All four detainees allege they are not enemy combatants.

that in applying the Boumediene factors, 13 1 the three detainees who are non-

32
Afghan citizens are "virtually identical" to Guantanamo Bay detainees.1 Judge
Bates reasoned because they are non-citizens "apprehended in foreign land;" de-

tained as enemy combatants in another foreign land; 133 and the "practical obstacles inherent in resolving" their detention at Bagram, while only slightly greater
than at Guantanamo Bay due to the active war zone, are not insurmountable

since the United States chose to transfer them to Bagram, where the United
States asserts a "degree of control.'

1 34

Judge Bates further held in regards to the

fourth detainee, "[w]hen a Bagram detainee has either been apprehended in Afghanistan or is a citizen of that country, the balance of factors may change," re123 ICCPR, supra note 113, art. 15(1). See also ACHR, supra note 115, art. 7,8.
128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008).
124 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. _,
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 2009 WL 863657 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2009).
128 Al Maqaleh, 2009 WL 863657, at *1, 3.
129 Al Maqaleh, 2009 WL 863657, at *1, 3. (While the term 'enemy combatant' has been abandoned in reference to detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, it is still in use at Bagram. Recently, the
Executive Branch has decided to abandon the term 'enemy combatant' as to detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, but not necessarily for those at Bagram. Each of these petitioners was determined to be
an enemy combatant through the process at Bagram for determining a detainee's status, and that term
has been employed by the parties in the briefing) (citations omitted)).
130 Id. at *3.
131 The three Boumediene factors discussed in Al Maqaleh are "(1) the citizenship and status
of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was made;
(2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical
obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ." Al Maqaleh, 2009 WL 863657,
at *8.
132 Id. at *2.
133 Here "foreign land" refers to any area that is not directly in the United States, land that is
"far from the United States." Id.
134 Id.
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1 35
suiting in the unavailability of expansion of U.S. jurisdiction to that detainee.
It is predicted that Judge Bates' decision will be overturned on appeal; 13 6 however, given the Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene, it seems more likely
that it will be upheld. Like Boumediene, Al Maqaleh undermines the United
States' ability to detain those people deemed necessary for national security purposes. It also undermines the basic purpose for detention, which is "to prevent
captured individuals from returning to the field of battle and taking up arms once
37
again."'
Another area in which such an extension of U.S. jurisdiction may apply is
President Obama's Executive Order 138 concerning Guantanamo Bay and the detainees within. As one of his first acts, President Obama ordered Guantanamo
Bay closed within one year.1 39 In accordance with this process, he began the
review of evidence against each detainee still held at Guantanamo Bay to determine who can be released and who cannot be released prior to a trial. 140 The
order also requires all U.S. personnel to follow the U.S. Army Field Manual
when interrogating detainees, which explicitly prohibits "threats, coercion, physical abuse and waterboarding. ' 1 41 Currently, this order does not extend to other
military detention facilities abroad also holding detainees.142 Should President
Obama extend this order to military detention bases abroad, he too will undermine the United States' ability to detain enemy combatants throughout and for
the duration of hostile situations. Without detention of enemy combatants in
wartime, President Obama runs the risk of increased espionage, treason, enemy
militia numbers, and loss of U.S. lives without ramifications for the actions of
enemy combatants.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The possible extension of U.S. jurisdiction to military bases abroad, as posed
by the Al Maqaleh decision, is a direct result of the Pandora's box the Supreme
135 Id. (emphasis added).
136 Charlie Savage, Detention at Afghan Base Is Subject to U.S. Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3,
2009, A14.
137 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
138 Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009), available at 2009 WL 166956 and
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-Office/ClosureOfGuantanamoDetentionFacilities/.
139 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, sec. 3. See also David Espo, Obama draft order calls for closing Guantanamo Bay, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 21, 2009, http://www.gopusa.com/newsl2009/januaryl0121-obama
_gitmo.shtml; Savage, supra note 136.
140 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, sec. 4. See also Espo, supra note 139.
141 Obama orders CIA prisons, Guantanamo shut: Presidentalso orders that all interrogations
must follow Army manual, Apr. 20, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28788175/ (last visited April
20, 2009) [hereinafter MSNBC Obama]. For a definition of waterboarding, see id. ("[A] technique
that creates the sensation of drowning and has been termed a form of torture by critics.").
142 Savage, supra note 136. However, it does extend to CIA "secret 'black site' prisons" used
to interrogate suspected terrorists. MSNBC Obama, supra note 141.
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Court has opened with its decisions in Rasul and Boumediene.14 3 In his dissent of
these cases, Justice Scalia predicted and feared that such an extension would essentially be the result of the majority's extension of U.S. jurisdiction to Guantanamo Bay. It is understandable as to why the Supreme Court eventually
extended jurisdiction to detainees at Guantanamo Bay since the United States
retains "complete jurisdiction and control" over the base. However, it becomes
illogical to extend the same jurisdiction to those military facilities that are not
under the "complete jurisdiction and control" of the United States. Many of the
facilities used for detention are within active war zones interning those who may
pose a more substantial threat to U.S. troops and U.S. national security than
those transferred to Guantanamo Bay. Furthermore, a detainee closer in proximity to these war zones may more readily take up arms again upon release from
a detention center abroad. For these reasons, it is imprudent to allow the further
extension of U.S. jurisdiction to detainees interned in international military facilities, especially those near active areas of conflict.
President Obama's current policy plan to close Guantanamo Bay is altogether
premature. In response to international and national pressures calling for the
closure of the base and release of detainees, President Obama is aggressively
advocating for Guantanamo Bay's closure. However, the real driving force behind the anti-Guantanamo Bay pressure is the failure to apply POW status to the
detainees interned at the base resulting in ill-treatment and denial of due process.
By merely closing the base and providing the current detainees access to courts
and due process, President Obama is not addressing the United States' poor application of the Geneva Convention. The closure is essentially a band-aid applied
to the real problem. The United States expects other High Contracting Parties to
provide POW status to any captured U.S. troop but is not willing to extend the
same status to citizens of other High Contracting Parties, as demonstrated by
Guantanamo Bay. Without addressing the underlying error of POW application,
the extension of due process to current Guantanamo Bay detainees does not prevent a similar situation from reoccurring in the future. Even closure of Guantanamo Bay will not prevent future reoccurrences of this nature because there are
other United States bases around the world that are currently interning detainees. Therefore, if President Obama wants to truly fix the problems at Guantanamo Bay, he should delve into the realities of how the application process of the
Geneva Convention is actually utilized by the United States rather than simply
closing the base.
With the push for the closing of Guantanamo Bay, President Obama has initiated an expedited review process of evidence, or lack thereof, against each detainee. The ultimate goal of these reviews is the immediate release of "innocent"
detainees and trials for those determined to be "terrorist" detainees. However,
143

Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466; Boumendiene, 128 S.Ct. at 2229.
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had the United States properly determined that there are POWs interned at
Guantanamo Bay, rather than maintaining its blanket refusal of POW status of
detainees, this review process would have already been in place and continuously
available for detainees. The Geneva Convention would have been applicable to
the detainees determined to be POWs, granting them a right to a fair hearing and
counsel, as provided by Articles 84 and 105. The Geneva Convention Article 84
states,
A prisoner of war shall be tried only by a military court, unless the existing
laws of the Detaining Power expressly permit the civil courts to try a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power in respect of the particular
offence alleged to have been committed by the prisoner of war.
In no circumstance whatever shall a prisoner of war be tried by a court of
any kind which does not offer the essential guarantees of independence and
impartiality as generally recognized, and in particular, the procedure of
which does not afford the accused the rights and means of defence [sic.]
provided for in Article 105.'44
Article 105 states in part,
The prisoner of war shall be entitled to assistance by one of his prisoner
comrades, to defence [sic.] by a qualified advocate or counsel of his own
choice, to the calling of witnesses and, if he deems necessary, to the services
of a competent interpreter. He shall be advised of these rights by the Detaining Power in due time before the trial.
[... I
He [the advocate or counsel] may, in particular, freely visit the accused and
interview him in private. He may also confer with any witness for the de1 45
fence, including prisoners of war.
However, an application of Article 84 to the Guantanamo Bay detainees by
the United States would create a conflict between the MCA by Congress and the
Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan. The MCA authorizes the use of military
commissions for detainees, but does not afford any simulation of a fair hearing.
On the other hand, Hamdan affirms that certain "structures and procedures of
military commission[s]" violate the Geneva Convention and should not be applied to try "purported enemy combatant[s].,' 146 Regardless of this conflict, it is
clear that neither military commissions nor extension of U.S. jurisdiction to
Guantanamo Bay have made any extraordinary strides towards granting fair
hearings. Under the Geneva Convention, detainees should have right to counsel,
either of their choice or provided for them, and access to confer with that coun144
145
146

Convention on POWs, supra note 10, art. 84.
Convention on POWs, supra note 10, art. 105.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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sel. But, the current situation at Guantanamo Bay leaves the detainees entirely
unaware that litigation on their behalf is even occurring. 147 Furthermore, the
possibility of indefinite detainment of detainees without ever receiving a charge
or trial to determine enemy combatant status is inexcusable.14 8 The United
States, in proper compliance with the Geneva Convention, should bring only
those to trial that have been found to have evidence against them of committing
crimes. If, after a specified time frame in which the detainee has been interned
by the United States, evidence is still not found against him and he is not charged,
he should be released immediately. However, upon release the United States
should make appropriate arrangements for the detainee to return back to his
country of origin. If there are threats of human rights violations occurring to the
detainee upon returning, the United States should aid in finding a country willing
to take the detainee, as Ireland has stated it is willing to do.' 4 9
A majority of the problems associated with the detentions at Guantanamo Bay
stem from the lack of an international body with the ability to enforce the Geneva Convention. The United States has been able to claim there are no detainees qualified as POWs held at Guantanamo Bay because there is no treaty body
to enforce the application of Article 4. An enforcing treaty body for the Geneva
Convention could reasonably be incorporated into the ICRC. In doing so, the
body could be set up similar to the Human Rights Committee, 5 ° which oversees
and enforces the ICCPR. The Human Rights Committee consists of eighteen
independent experts 151 that monitor the implementation of the ICCPR by member states. 152 All member states are obligated to submit regular reports detailing
147 Cuba - Guantanamo Bay, supra note 38 ("JOE MARGUILES: Not only have I not met
them, they don't know that litigation's even going on, they don't even know that the litigation is going
on their behalf and we're not allowed to tell them.").
148 Id. ("DANIEL CAVOLI, ICRC Head of Mission: The big problem we have is that allthese
people are in a legal limbo, they cannot challenge their detention and they've been kept until now
since 15 months outside judicial process completely."). See also, Al Maqaleh, 2009 WL 863657, at *1
(D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2009) (Detainees were held for "six or more years.").
149 Amnesty International, Ireland's offer to accept Guantfnamo detainees must be matched,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/irelands-offer-accept-guant% C3 %Alnamo-detainees-must-be-matched-20090320 (last visited Apr. 20, 2009) (Currently, Obama is working with the
European Union to determine if released detainees will be accepted into any European countries by
their governments.).
150 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Committee: Monitoring civil and political rights, http://www2.ohchr.orglenglishlbodieslhrc/index.htm (last
visited Apr. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Human Rights Committee].
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OVERVIEW OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, POWERS, FUNCrnONS AND PERFORMANCE

OF THE ICCPR COMMITrEE 1, http://iilj.org/courses/documents/OverviewofUNHumanRts.Comm.pdf.
The experts are chosen representatives from the eighteen sitting countries who have "personal capacity, "high moral character", and "recognized competence" with emphasis on their "compelling legal
experience, the compelling inference is that Committee members are to act independently of the
governments of their states, not under orders of their government." Id. at 1-2.
152 Human Rights Committee, supra note 149.
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"how the rights are being implemented., 153 These reports are reviewed by the
committee experts who then address any concerns, violations, and recommendations to the member state in "the form of 'concluding observations."' 154 Should
the ICRC incorporate a similar committee to enforce the Geneva Convention,
countries would be held accountable for their actions and may be more apt to
correctly apply the protections detainees should be afforded under the Geneva
Convention. However, if the ICRC took on the enforcement of the Geneva Convention, it would place itself in a precarious position creating more harm for the
detainees because countries would be less likely to allow the ICRC into their
facilities to aid detainees without the assurance of the utmost confidentiality that
the ICRC currently upholds.
Regardless of whether an enforcing treaty body is created, the United States
has always maintained that its own laws are "the supreme law of the land, 15 5 and
any treaty or international document in conflict with those laws will be disregarded. However, if the treaty body truly had the power and authority to enforce
the Geneva Convention, it should essentially trump any law created by the
United States that may conflict with it. But to date, there has not been a treaty
body that the United States has recognized as having authority over it or its enforcement of a treaty. As articulated in Medellin v. Texas, "[w]hile a treaty may
constitute an international commitment, it is not binding domestic law unless
Congress has enacted statutes implementing it or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be 'self-executing' and is ratified on that basis."' 156 With the creation of a treaty body with the authority to bind all High Contracting Parties to the
Geneva Convention, there would be little doubt of mistreatment of detainees
who are afforded POW status.
CONCLUSION

The United States has tarnished its own international and national reputation
with its constant refusal to acknowledge that prisoners of war are interned at
Guantanamo Bay effectively restricting the application of the Geneva Convention and prisoner of war status to the detainees. The United States has remained
tight-lipped about activities at Guantanamo Bay leaving the public to rely upon
accusations by released detainees and the media as to what is actually occurring.
While the U.S. Supreme Court has extended de facto jurisdiction to the Guantanamo Bay detainees, it has simultaneously created the possibility and inevitability
of further extension of U.S. jurisdiction to other U.S. military bases in active war
zones abroad. Rather than close Guantanamo Bay, as President Obama has pro153
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Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. 6.
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 1348 (2008).

MISSING IN ACTION

177

posed, efforts should be put into correcting the prevalent mistakes of application
of the Geneva Convention and POW status to prevent a similar situation from
occurring in the future. Regardless of the detainees' classifications, they are entitled to a fair hearing either under the Geneva Convention as a POWs or under
the ICCPR. However, to effectively resolve all the issues present at Guantanamo
Bay and hold the United States responsible for its actions, an international treaty
body with the authority to enforce the Geneva Convention is a necessity. The
United States, in its "War on Terror," has been able to blatantly ignore the
proper application of prisoner of war status to detainees essentially stripping both
the United States and its' detainees of their dignity and self-respect.

